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ABSTRACT
Emerging digital environments and infrastructures, such as
distributed security services and distributed computing ser-
vices, have generated new options of communication, infor-
mation sharing, and resource utilization in past years. How-
ever, when distributed services are used, the question arises
of to what extent we can trust service providers to not violate
security requirements, whether in isolation or jointly. An-
swering this question is crucial for designing trustworthy dis-
tributed systems and selecting trustworthy service providers.
This paper presents a novel trust measurement method for
distributed systems, and makes use of propositional logic
and probability theory. The results of the qualitative part
include the specification of a formal trust language and the
representation of its terms by means of propositional logic
formulas. Based on these formulas, the quantitative part re-
turns trust metrics for the determination of trustworthiness
with which given distributed systems are assumed to fulfill
a particular security requirement.
1. INTRODUCTION
Emerging digital environments and infrastructures have
rapidly generated new ways and services of communication,
information sharing, and resource utilization for individuals,
organizations, and societies in past years. For example, it
has become common for individuals to use security services,
such as I2P Anonymous Network and TOR. Organizations
have started to explore the opportunities of web services, in-
cluding storage services (e.g., Amazon Simple Storage Ser-
vice) and computing services (e.g., Microsoft’s Azure Ser-
vices Platform and Google App Engine). While the afore-
mentioned services are realized with cloud computing, ser-
vices can also be requested from multiple administrative do-
mains (grid computing). Even whole societies are involved
in scenarios with shared information and transaction pro-
cessing, as political elections with Internet voting systems
show [31].
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What all these services have in common is that some
kind of distributed information processing and/or informa-
tion sharing occurs, across private, organizational, or na-
tional boundaries. Often, consumers of these services have
no control over their data, and they need to trust service
providers not to violate their security policies. For exam-
ple, scientific computation results can be modified or pro-
vided to third parties. In some cases, organizational, legal,
and/or technical countermeasures have been taken in order
to prevent or to mitigate the consequences of data abuse.
For example, in Internet voting the separation of duties is
quite common in order to realize the separation of voter’s
identity and his/her vote. In such cases, the abuse of data
by a single party does not disclose confidential information.
However, what happens when multiple parties maliciously
cooperate and join their information? This leads to scenar-
ios where a voter’s ID can be assigned to his/her vote, where
the identity of a user is disclosed through the cooperation
of parties of an anonymity mix net, etc. Attacks like these
are referred to as “insider attacks”1, which are committed by
service providers in isolation or jointly. Consequently, when
distributed services are used, the question arises of whether
service customers can trust the aggregated service and the
underlying distributed system, or, to be more precise, of how
they can determine the level of trust. Answering these ques-
tions is crucial for designing trustworthy distributed systems
and selecting trustworthy service providers.
Similar to the field of security where it is widely argued
that measurement and metrics are necessary to justify in-
vestments in security and to manage security [1,24,25], trust
assessment should capture quantitatively the perceived abil-
ity of the system to resist attacks against a particular se-
curity requirement. The main purpose of this paper is to
present a novel approach for trust measurement in heteroge-
nous distributed systems that relies on propositional logic
and probability theory, and that includes the proposition of
trust metrics.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion 2 presents related work. In Section 3, we describe our
research framework. Section 4 proposes a formal trust lan-
guage and demonstrates it applicability. Section 5 shows
how language terms can be mapped on propositional logic
terms, which are used in Section 6 to develop trust met-
rics. Finally, we discuss our approach and propose further
research paths.
1We do not consider outsider attacks, such as those com-
mitted by hackers.
2. RELATEDWORK
There is a substantial body of literature on concepts, mod-
els, evaluation, and management of trust in digital envi-
ronments (see [13, 17, 27] for a detailed overview). Ana-
lyzing this body, [22] identifies two lines of research: The
first strand is based on a technical understanding coined
by [6] and includes the“access-control list”approach and the
“credential-based”approach, e.g., [5,7]. The second strand is
“experience-based” and assumes that an entity’s trust in an-
other one is based on past behavior [22]. This strand focuses
on general models for deriving trust from previous evidence
that are especially capable of expressing the uncertainty that
is associated to the derived trust values, e.g., [16,26], on the
robust aggregation of direct experience and recommenda-
tions [28, 34, 39], and on the application of those models in
different scenarios like eCommerce [3], mobile ad hoc net-
works [10], or P2P networks [20]. Security-related applica-
tions of trust have especially been proposed in the field of
public key infrastructures starting in the 90s [2, 23] up to
now, e.g., [21] is a valuable example and presents a model
for reliability and public-key authenticity that is based on
logic and probability theory.
Our paper also draws on this theoretical basis, but it fo-
cuses on the evaluation of the trustworthiness of distributed
systems based on the knowledge of the trustworthiness of its
components. To this end, we build on current “experience-
based”, probabilistic approaches for modeling trust, how-
ever, we provide a novel concept for deriving the trustwor-
thiness of a complex system from the trustworthiness of its
components. The proposed approach is especially capable
of dealing with the dependencies between the components
in the system and their redundancy with respect to the se-
curity requirements under consideration. In this way, our
contribution is also related to approaches for evaluating se-
curity requirements, e.g., [14, 18, 30]. However, attack trees
require knowledge on the implementation [18, 30], and the
evaluation of system reliability addresses a particular secu-
rity requirement only [14].
Regarding metrics, the literature often provides joint tax-
onomies of security and trust metrics. We identified two per-
spectives on such metrics: The first perspective is aligned to
the objects the metrics refer to. [36] propose a taxonomy for
information assurance metrics consisting of organizational
security metrics and metrics for “Technical Target of Assess-
ment”. [29] suggest a high-level information security metrics
taxonomy that divides business-level security metrics into
five categories: (1) trust metrics for business collaboration,
(2) security metrics for business-level risk management, (3)
security metrics for information security management in the
organization, (4) security metrics for cost-benefit analysis,
and (5) security, dependability and trust metrics for ICT
products, systems and services. The metrics proposed in
this paper fall into categories 1 and 5. The literature re-
view of [33] distinguishes between metrics based on policy
compliance and technical metrics. The NIST Performance
Measurement Guide for Information Security [24] focuses on
ex post security measures (the document does not sharply
distinguish metrics and measures). [9] surveys economic ap-
proaches for security metrics. The authors identify two main
areas of research, where one has its roots in investment and
decision theory and is mainly pursued in the field of infor-
mation technology-oriented business administration, and the
other area has ancestors in micro-economics and deals with
market concepts to gather security-relevant information.
3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
Before we present our research framework, we operational-
ize key notions of our paper, measurement, metric, and trust,
none of which are consistently defined in the literature. We
refer to
• measurement as an abstraction process that “ [. . .] re-
duces the complexity of one or several attributes of the
original system to a single symbol [or to several sym-
bols]” [8, p. 7], where a symbol can be at various nu-
merical scale levels (e.g., at nominal level for the pur-
pose of classification, or at ordinal or cardinal level for
the purpose of comparison),
• metric as a well defined function that takes a particular
system from the set of systems S and maps it to an
element of an (ordered) set V, i.e. f : S ⇒ V [8, p. 7],
• trust as “ [. . .] a particular level of the subjective prob-
ability with which an agent assesses that another agent
or group of agents will perform a particular action
[. . .]” [11, p. 217f].
In our context, “agents or group of agents” refers to service
providers, who provide the requested service by contempo-
raneously meeting a particular security requirement r (e.g.,
anonymity, confidentiality). The assurance of r corresponds
to what is referred to as “perform a particular action”.
An overview of our research approach is shown in Figure
1. The basic concept of the model we propose in this paper
draws on [15, 37], who use secret shares [4] and the con-
cept that k out of n entities are required for reconstructing
the secret key and correspondingly decrypting a cyphertext.
We adapt this concept to the context of trust, and propose
an approach for modeling distributed, heterogenous systems
where “k out of N entities need to show trustworthy behav-
ior” (compare to [38]), in order to not compromise the trust-
worthiness of the overall system. Note, in case of Shamir’s
secret sharing [32] the property k out of n means that you
need to trust k out of N regarding availability and n−k+ 1
out of N regarding secrecy (where N is the set of share hold-
ers and n the number of share holders). Thus, the choice of
the actual value of k dependents on the security requirement
under consideration.
In contrast to the aforementioned papers, which regard
entities as homogeneous, we account for heterogeneity of
entities in terms of security requirements by explicitly item-
izing them in a set N . We use this model for the proposition
of a formal trust language, which contains trustworthiness
terms, which formally describe trustworthiness properties of
a system (regarding a particular security requirement). It
should be noticed that different security requirements on a
system can lead to different trustworthiness terms. E.g., in
a system that implements a mixnet that routes messages
sequentially through a set N of n anonymizing nodes, each
node must be trustworthy with regard to availability (n out
of N), while only one node needs to be trustworthy with
regard to achieving anonymity (1 out of N). Consequently,
a system needs to deal with a trade-off between different
security requirements.
While trustworthiness terms are a useful representation of
trustworthiness, they are less appropriate for comparing al-
ternative systems and for determining the probability with
which systems meet a particular security requirement. We
Figure 1: Research framework
prove that each trustworthiness term can be mapped on a
propositional logic term such that both terms are semanti-
cally equivalent, and we show that this mapping is a useful
way to overcome these limitations. We also show that propo-
sitional logic terms (given in conjunctive normal form) are a
representation that allows to determine straightforward the
overall probability with which a system is assumed to ful-
fill a particular security requirement. The determination of
those probabilities result in the definition of trust metrics.
4. TRUSTWORTHINESS TERMS
As our trustworthiness terms address distributed systems,
we first define distributed systems: A distributed system is
either an “atomic system” or is composed of other (sub)-
systems. We define a system as “atomic” if it contains only
(atomic) components that are not being split any further.
These components can be persons, computers, or even orga-
nizational units.
The definition of trustworthiness terms in terms of syntax
and semantics follows the inductive definition of systems and
is provided by definitions 1-4. In order to keep definitions
short, we introduce the abbreviation “wrts. r” (with regard
to security requirement r).
Let S be an atomic system with the set of atomic compo-
nents A = {Ai}ni=1.
Definition 1. A system S can be described by the trust-
worthiness term (k out of N), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A,
wrts. r
:⇔
{
At least k components out of N need to show trust-
worthy behavior wrts. r so that S meets require-
ment r.
In order to get more flexible representations of require-
ments on atomic systems, we define the following trustwor-
thiness terms:
Definition 2. A system S can be described by the trust-
worthiness term a) ((k1 ? . . . ? km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm)),
b) ((k1> . . .> km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm)), ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Ni|},
Ni ⊆ A ∀i, wrts. r
:⇔

For a) each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, b) any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
at least ki components out of Ni need to show
trustworthy behavior wrts. r so that S meets re-
quirement r.
With regard to non-atomic systems, we define trustwor-
thiness terms similarly: Let {Si}ni=1 be (sub)systems of a
system S, and let system Si be described by the following
trustworthiness term li for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 3. A system S can be described by the trust-
worthiness term (k out of {li1 , . . . , lim}), k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
{i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, wrts. r
:⇔
{
At least k systems out of {Si1 , . . . , Sim} need to
show trustworthy behavior wrts. r so that S meets
requirement r.
Definition 4. A system S can be described by the trust-
worthiness term a) ((k1 ? . . . ? km) out of (Q1, . . . , Qm)),
b) ((k1 > . . .> km) out of (Q1, . . . , Qm)), ki ∈ {1, . . . , |Qi|},
Qi ⊆ {l1, . . . , ln} ∀i, wrts. r
:⇔

For a) each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, b) any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
at least ki systems out of the set of systems
for which Qi contains trustworthiness terms need
show trustworthy behavior wrts. r so that S meets
requirement r.
We now illustrate the analysis and the determination of
trustworthiness terms with an example.
Example 1. We use a web service scenario, in which a
retailer uses three web services in order to identify cus-
tomers’ behavior. Service A offers data mining capabilities
and stores sales data, including customer IDs. Service B is
offered by a financial service provider, who provides credit
ratings of customers. Service C provides storage capaci-
ties and stores master data on customers, including their
customer IDs and identities. In this example, we consider
secrecy with regard to information on which customer has
bought what under which financial conditions. Secrecy is
kept if one of the providers A and B is trustworthy, or if
one of B and C is trustworthy. With regard to provider A,
we assume that this provider accounts for secrecy by stor-
ing data on two components (A3 and A4) and implement-
ing a secret share mechanism [4]. Components A1 and A2
are responsible for distributed computation in terms of data
mining; both components get data from A3 and A4. With
regard to financial service provider B, customer IDs gener-
ated by B (they differ from customer IDs stored at A) are
stored on B1 and B2 together with financial data by imple-
menting a secret share mechanism. Components B3 and B4
store names of customers and customer IDs (generated by
B) redundantly. Analogous to A and B, storage provider C
implements a secret share mechanism when storing customer
data. Figure 2 shows the overall system S. In the following,
l refers to the complete system and li with i ∈ {1, 2, 3} to its
subsystems as indicated in Figure 2. Applying definitions 1,
2a, 2b, and 4b, we yield the following trustworthiness terms
with respect to the secrecy requirement:
• A: ((2? 1) out of ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:l1
(def. 2a)
• B: ((1> 2) out of ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:l2
(def. 2b)
• C: (1 out of {C1, C2})︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:l3
(def. 1)
• S: ((1> 1) out of ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3})) (def. 4b)
Figure 2: Example of the inductive determination
of trustworthiness terms
5. PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC
TRUSTWORTHINESS TERMS
As example 1 shows, trustworthiness terms can become
complex, even for small systems. In order to yield represen-
tations that are comfortable to interpret for persons and ap-
propriate for the computation of the probability with which
a system fulfills a specific requirement r, we transform trust-
worthiness terms into propositional logic formulas. Particu-
larly useful is the subsequent transformation of formulas into
semantically equivalent formulas in normal form, such as the
disjunctive normal form (DNF) or the conjunctive normal
form (CNF). These normal forms show different strengths:
while the CNF allows to determine “weak points”, such as
single points of failure, the DNF is useful for identifying
“strong points”, such as components or subsystems where
trustworthiness results in the trustworthiness of the overall
system, regardless of the trustworthiness of other compo-
nents and subsystems. Thus, both normal forms should be
applied complementarily. Due to limited space, we decided
to use only CNF in this paper.
Theorem 5.1. Let system S consist of basic components
A = {A1, . . . An}, and let {XA1 , . . . , XAn} be literals with
XAi = true ∀i, if Ai is trustworthy wrts. r. Then, the trust-
worthiness term l of S can be mapped on a propositional logic
formula f(l) such that S is trustworthy wrts. r if and only if
f(l) is true. (For the proof see Appendix A.)
We use the example shown in Figure 2 to illustrate how
to determine the propositional logic formula of particular
trustworthiness terms, namely l1, l2, l3, and l .
Example 2.
• l1 = ((2? 1) out of ({A1, A2}, {A3, A4}))
⇒ f(l1) (10)= (f((2 out of {A1, A2})))∧
(f((1 out of {A3, A4})))
(9)
= ((A1 ∧A2)) ∧ ((A3) ∨ (A4)) = A1∧
A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4) =: fA
• l2 = ((1> 2) out of ({B1, B2}, {B3, B4}))
⇒ f(l2) (11)= (f((1 out of {B1, B2})))∨
(f((2 out of {B3, B4})))
(9)
= ((B1 ∨B2)) ∨ ((B3) ∧B4))
= B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4) =: fB
• l3 = (1 out of {C1, C2})
⇒ f(l3) (9)= (C1) ∨ (C2) = C1 ∨ C2 =: fC
• l = ((1> 1) out of ({l1, l2}, {l2, l3}))
⇒ f(l) (14)= (f((1 out of {l1, l2})))∨
(f((2 out of {l2, l3})))
(12)
= (((f(l1))) ∨ ((f(l2)))) ∨ (((f(l2)))∨
((f(l3))))
= (f(l1)) ∨ (f(l2)) ∨ (f(l3))
= (fA) ∨ (fB) ∨ (fC)
= (A1 ∧A2 ∧ (A3 ∨A4))∨
(B1 ∨B2 ∨ (B3 ∧B4)) ∨ (C1 ∨ C2)
(1)
Finally, we convert the resulting propositional logic term
given in (1) into CNF.
∧
X ∈ {A1, A2, A3}
Y ∈ {A1, A2, A4}
Z ∈ {B3, B4}
(X ∨ Y ∨B1 ∨B2 ∨ Z ∨ C1 ∨ C2) (2)
(2) can be easily derived when we first transform (1) into
DNF, given by
(A1∧A2∧A3)∨(A1∧A2∧A4)∨B1∨B2∨(B3∧B4)∨C1∨C2
The CNF formula given in (2) reveals that system S can
be trustworthy with respect to secrecy requirement r if at
least one of the components B1, B2, C1, C2 is trustworthy
wrts. r, which is a sufficient, but not necessary condition.
While propositional logic terms are useful to describe re-
quirements on the trustworthiness of distributed systems,
they do not provide a metric because they are unordered
(and at nominal scale level only). In order to quantitatively
assess propositional logic terms, we need to assign (trust)
values to them. A straightforward approach is to draw on
trustworthiness terms of the system components, which are
represented by literals, and then to aggregate the attached
trust values according to the way the literals are arranged
in the propositional logic term.2 The following section pro-
poses a probabilistic approach towards using and aggregat-
ing trust values.
6. TRUST METRICS
In order to determine trust in the complete distributed
system, i.e., the subjective probability with which the com-
plete distributed system fulfills a particular security require-
ment r, we need to consider the trustworthiness of each com-
ponent regarding r as well as the dependencies and require-
ments which are expressed in the trustworthiness terms. In
the following, we assume that trust values of the atomic
components regarding security requirement r are given. In
the simplest case, the probability that each atomic compo-
nent fulfills the security requirement r can be derived from
historical data only. However, in order to take into account
2As trust is related to a particular requirement, we get for
each component and (sub)system as many trust values as
requirements exist.
uncertainty when modeling these probabilities, we propose
to use the models presented in [16, 26]. Besides expressing
uncertainty those models build on a Bayesian approach for
deriving subjective probabilities from subjective knowledge
and past experience3.
Regardless of the particular model for determining atomic
trust values, the advantage of having propositional logic
terms available is that we only need to define how the prob-
abilities of the respective atomic trust values are aggregated
depending on the logical operators ∨,∧,¬.
According to probability theory, we regard each atomic
formula/component L as a Bernoulli random variable XL
with E(XL) = p, where p is the probability that component
L and the respective service provider fulfill a particular secu-
rity requirement. As the trust concept adopted in this paper
also considers attacks due to malicious cooperation of enti-
ties, we draw on joint distributions of malicious cooperation.
In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that the bias of
entities to maliciously cooperate with other entities depends
on who or what the other components are. Thus, we account
for joint distributions of stochastically dependent variables,
and we consequently apply conditional probabilities4. We
define
g : PLT = {propositional logic terms} → [0, 1] :
If F1, F2 ∈ PLT, then
g(¬F1) := 1− g(F1) (3)
g(F1 ∧ F2) := g(F2|F1) · g(F1),
g(F2|F1) := P (XF2 |XF1)
(4)
(2), (3)⇒ g(F1 ∨ F2) = g(¬(¬F1 ∧ ¬F2))
= 1− g(¬F1 ∧ ¬F2)
= 1− [g(¬F2|¬F1) · g(¬F1)]
= 1− [(1− g(F2|¬F1))(1− g(F1))]
(5)
If a propositional logic term F is in CNF, i.e. F = F1∧ . . .∧
Fn, Fi = Fi,1 ∨ . . .∨ Fi,ni , i = 1, . . . , n, then the application
of equations (3)-(5) yields
g(F ) = g(Fn|F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn−1) · g(F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn−1), n ≥ 2
g(Fi) = 1− [(1− g(Fi,ni |¬(Fi,1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fi,ni−1)))·
(1− g(Fi,1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fi,ni−1))], ni ≥ 2 ∀i
(6)
When the trustworthiness term of a system S is trans-
formed into the respective CNF, then the application of
equation (6) allows for the recursive computation of the
probability with which S is assumed to fulfill requirement
r.
Applying the aforementioned evaluation steps results in
a trustworthiness term, propositional logic formulas, and a
trust value for each requirement r. In order to assess and
potentially compare distributed systems with regard to a
particular security requirement r, we need to address two
challenges: First, in the presence of multiple requirements
we get a multi-criteria decision problem, where trade-offs
3Both approaches can be applied for experiments with bi-
nary outcomes.
4See Eq. (4) where P (XF2 |XF1) is a conditional probability.
between security requirements need to be addressed. Sec-
ond, assessing and comparing distributed systems wrts. r
only in terms of their probabilities assumes that the deci-
sion maker does not take into account how the probability
was computed and how the architecture of the overall sys-
tem looks like. For example, an overall probability 0.75 can
result from a) one basic component where the probability of
meeting requirement r is 0.75, or b) from a system with two
components A,B where at least one component need to ful-
fill requirement r (trustworthiness term =(1 out of {A,B}))
in order to trust system S wrts. r and where the probability
with regard to fulfilling r is 0.5 for both A and B. When
comparing alternative systems with equal probability val-
ues, we suggest to also draw on trustworthiness terms and
their respective CNF representations in order to rank these
systems.5
As a propositional logic term in CNF is a conjunction of
disjunctive clauses, we define redundancy-oriented prefer-
ence relations (≺red+,≺red-) by drawing on the numbers of
literals of disjunctive clauses:
Let F,G be two finite propositional logic terms in CNF,
where in each term its’ disjunctive clauses are arranged in
ascending order of the numbers of their literals (e.g., F =
A ∧ (B ∨ C) ∧ (A ∨B ∨D)):
F = F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fn, Fi = Fi,1 ∨ . . . ∨ Fi,pi ,
i = 1, . . . , n; p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pn
G = G1 ∧ . . . ∧Gm, Gj = Gj,1 ∨ . . . ∨Gj,qj ,
j = 1, . . . ,m; q1 ≤ . . . ≤ qm
Then
F ≺red+ G :⇔ ∃k pk < qk and pl = ql ∀1 < l < k (7)
F ≺red- G :⇔ ∃k pk > qk and pl = ql ∀1 < l < k (8)
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper presents a novel formal approach towards the
trust assessment of distributed systems. The approach in-
cludes the specification of trustworthiness terms and the
proposition of quantitative trust metrics, which allow to as-
sess and compare systems. Especially, the provided concept
provides a means for deriving trust in a complex system from
trust in its components and subsystems. The proposed ap-
proach is especially capable of dealing with the dependen-
cies between the components and subsystems and their re-
dundancy with respect to the security requirements under
consideration. Thus, having formal descriptions and trust
figures available, designers of distributed systems and cus-
tomers of distributed services have quantitative information
at hand that allow them to determine the impact of select-
ing specific services or specific system designs based on their
trust perceptions. A key advantage of our approach lies in
its generality and flexibility: it is scalable with regard to the
granularity and type of atomic components (persons, PCs,
machines, organizational units, services etc.), and capable
of covering systems that go beyond boundaries of organiza-
tions.
5While our ranking procedure applies two criteria (proba-
bility and structure) sequentially, an alternative approach
would be to assess systems in a multi-criteria sense by con-
sidering both criteria contemporaneously. Due to space lim-
itation, we do not follow this approach here.
On the other hand, we need to discuss assumptions and
limitations of our approach. First, we have to accept that
any metric simplifies any complex socio-technical situation
down to numbers or partial orders [29]. Second, by adopt-
ing propositional logic we assume that trust in a (sub)system
with regard to a particular security requirement r depends
only on r-related trust in parts of the system. When inter-
dependencies between different requirements occur (e.g., the
availability of subsystem A affects the anonymity of system
S), our model needs to be extended. One option is to ap-
ply first-order logic, where A(r) means that system A meets
requirement r. Third, our evaluation is based on a central-
ized perspective, i.e. the assessment of systems is done by a
central party.
Beyond research on the aforementioned topics, we suggest
the following paths for further research: (a) Currently, we
have to address different requirements in separate expres-
sions. In the future, trustworthiness terms and trust met-
rics need to be extended to enable trust statements for all
addressed requirements at once. Research can draw upon
a comprehensive set of methods proposed in the field of
multi-criteria decision making [35]. This extension should be
flexible enough to allow different weighings of requirements
regarding different stakeholders. For instance, one might
emphasis on privacy while the other one might emphasis on
the quality of the service. (b) The application of our met-
rics can lead to the development of distributed architectures
patterns [12], which would support the design of trustworthy
architectures. Pattern have already proven to be useful in
other fields, such as in software development and in security
design. (c) The operators for ∨,∧,¬, which are currently de-
fined for probability values only, could be replaced by the op-
erators defined for ‘subjective logic’ in [19]. Thus, one could
benefit from modeling uncertainty not only when determin-
ing and modeling the trust values of the atomic components,
but also when deriving the trust value of the complete sys-
tem. (d) The extension of our approach on other kinds of
uncertainty theories, such as fuzzy set theory, allows to deal
with scenarios where no probabilities are available [40, 41].
(e) In the economic context, further work on the application
of our metrics is useful: Given a formal relationship between
investments and the increase of trust in a particular compo-
nent or system, decision makers can build on our metrics to
determine those components with the highest marginal ben-
efit of security investments, i.e. decision makers know the
optimal “points” of investment. Given a budget for security
investments, decision makers can also use our models to de-
termine the optimal resource allocation, i.e. to decide on
how much should be spent for each component in order to
maximize the level of trust in the distributed system.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOF FOR THEOREM 5.1
Proof. We prove the theorem along the inductive def-
inition of trustworthiness terms, and we provide for each
definition of trustworthiness terms the corresponding propo-
sitional logic formula. The principal idea of the proof is that
we reformulate the expression “k out of a set L” by explic-
itly considering all combinations of elements of L, where L
can be either a set of basic components or of trustworthiness
terms of subsystems. The provision of such a mapping f (of
trustworthiness terms on propositional logic terms) proves
the theorem.
• If l = (k out of N), k ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}, N ⊆ A (def. 1),
then
f(l) :=
∨
{Ai1 , . . . , Aik} ⊆ A
|{Ai1 , . . . , Aik}| = k
(
ik∧
j=i1
Aj
)
(9)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm)), Ni ⊆ A ∀i
(def. 2a), then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki out of Ni))) (10)
• If l = ((k1 > . . .> km) out of (N1, . . . , Nm)), Ni ⊆ A ∀i
(def. 2b), then
f(l) :=
m∨
i=1
(f((ki out of Ni))) (11)
• If l = (k out of {li1 , . . . , lim}) , lij trustworthiness
terms, {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} (def. 3), then
f(l) :=
∨
{j1, . . . , jk} ⊆ {i1, . . . , im}
|{j1, . . . , jk}| = k
(
jk∧
j=j1
(f(lj))
)
(12)
• If l = ((k1 ? . . .? km) out of (Q1, . . . , Qm)) , Qi set of
trustworthiness terms (def. 4a), then
f(l) :=
m∧
i=1
(f((ki out of Qi))) (13)
• If l = ((k1 > . . .> km) out of (Q1, . . . , Qm)) , Qi set of
trustworthiness terms (def. 4b), then
f(l) :=
m∨
i=1
(f((ki out of Qi))) (14)
